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Abstract
The Durbin Amendment is the first of the major provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act to have been implemented—but only after it withstood a
constitutional challenge on the basis of the Takings Clause in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Now that the Amendment has
taken effect, this Article addresses the false economic logic that led to its
passage and the dubious arguments used to sustain its constitutionality. On
the first issue, the supporters of the Durbin Amendment denounced the
highly effective debit card system as a form of cartelization of the industry,
which yields excessive returns to banks while overcharging retailers high
rates for low-cost services. That objection rests on three central fallacies.
The first is that the industry is monopolistic, when in fact, there is
extensive competition for customers at every level. The second is that this
critique ignores the economics of two-sided markets, under which transfer
payments from retailers to customers expands the universe of debit card
customers, spreading around the cost of operating the system. The third is
that the costs of providing debit card services are limited to the marginal
costs of providing services, but this critique ignores the fixed costs
necessary to put the system in place.
The failure to realize that these fixed costs need protection against
government expropriation is the central error of the Eighth Circuit, which
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falsely assumed that firms in competitive industries need less protection
than regulated monopolies. The paradox is that this argument gets it
exactly backwards. The justification for regulating natural monopolies is to
imitate competitive rates to the extent possible. But that justification is
singularly unavailable with the debit card industry, which the Eighth
Circuit held lacked monopoly power. At this point, there is no justification
for any rate regulation, given that the debit card companies are already at
the competitive rate and cannot recoup all their losses—direct charges to
their customers requires the loss of the efficiency gains that interchange
fees are able to exploit to good effect in a two-sided economic market.
Thus, the Durbin Amendment, because of paradoxical thinking, has
resulted in unconstitutional regulatory takings of the debit card companies.
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INTRODUCTION: THE DURBIN PARADOX
Congress, with great fanfare, signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law on July 21, 2010.1 The
legislation contains many complex provisions that regulate major features
of the banking and credit system in the United States. Without question,
the two most important and controversial portions of this statute are its
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which is charged with the task of
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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dealing with the “systematic risks” that large banks and other financial
institutions are said to impose on the economy, and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, which gives the federal government vast
powers to regulate a wide range of credit card lending practices in the
United States.2
This Article, however, shall bypass these epochal developments.
Instead, it shall focus on one lesser feature of the Act, the Durbin
Amendment, which is found in section 1075 of the Act and regulates in a
systematic fashion the debit card interchange fees that banks can charge
merchants through various intermediaries,3 most notably Visa and
MasterCard. Those provisions were recently subject to a constitutional
challenge by TCF National Bank, which lost in both the U.S. District Court
for the District of South Dakota4 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.5 The central basis of the challenge was that the restrictive
rate structure under the Durbin Amendment was a confiscatory taking in
violation of the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.6
The purpose of this Article is to attack these decisions for their odd
inversion of constitutional law, which I call the paradox of the Durbin
Amendment. It is commonly assumed that the government has a greater
ability to regulate firms that hold monopoly power than those which
operate in a competitive industry.7 It is on this ground alone that the
elaborate body of constitutional doctrine allows for some government
regulation of natural monopolies. The basic position is that the law should
seek to work its way between two obstacles. First, it must make sure that a
firm that is the sole supplier in a given territory does receive monopoly
rents. But it also must make sure that the firm’s invested capital is not
confiscated, which is done by assuring the firm a competitive rate of return
on its investment. What is distinctive about the Durbin Amendment
2. For a detailed discussion of the statute, see C. Boyden Gray & John Shu, The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act of 2010: Is It Constitutional?, ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, Dec. 2010, at 66, http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20101223_Gray
ShuEngage11.3.pdf.
3. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075, 124 Stat. at 2068.
4. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059,
at *14 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011). For the record, I
worked closely with TCF in the initial stages of the case through the preliminary hearing of April 4,
2011, before Judge Lawrence L. Piersol of the South Dakota District Court.
5. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF II), 643 F.3d 1158, 1165 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).
6. See TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1163. The relevant provision of the Fifth Amendment reads, “nor
[shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307–16 (1989) (discussing these
rationales); see also Michael W. McConnell, Public Utilities’ Private Rights: Paying for Failed
Nuclear Power Projects, 12 REGULATION, no. 2, 1988 at 35, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv12n2/reg12n2-mcconnell.html.
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decisions is that they turn this balance upside down. The courts that
recognize the need to protect firms with monopoly power deny that
protection to firms whose invested capital is in a competitive industry.
In order to deal with these issues, it is necessary to set the issue in
context. The topic here is by no means insignificant because of the rapidly
expanding size of the debit interchange market. As Judge Lawrence L.
Piersol wrote:
Networks reported that debit and prepaid interchange fees
totaled $16.2 billion in 2009. The average interchange fee for
all debit transactions was 44 cents per transaction, or 1.14
percent of the transaction amount. The average interchange
fee for a signature debit transaction was 56 cents, or 1.53
percent of the transaction amount. The average interchange
fee for a PIN debit transaction was significantly lower than
that of a signature debit transaction, at 23 cents per
transaction, or 0.56 percent of the transaction amount. Prepaid
card interchange fees were similar to those of signature debit,
averaging 50 cents per transaction, or 1.53 percent of the
transaction amount.8
These revenues are not, of course, pure profit. A large fraction of them
are needed to design, build, repair, and upgrade the basic debit card
system—a system that has grown so rapidly in recent years that it now
handles both more transactions and more dollars than the credit card
system, with checks and cash occupying an ever smaller fraction of the
overall payments market.9 The Durbin Amendment has proven such a jolt
to the system that it has been the subject of extensive legislative
reexamination, including a failed effort by Senators John Tester of
Montana and Bob Corker of Tennessee to postpone the implementation of
the Amendment for a year in order to better gauge its economic effects.10
At the same time, the Federal Reserve Board has worked full tilt to issue
the Amendment’s necessary implementing regulations, putting out a
preliminary set of highly restrictive regulations on December 16, 2010,11
8. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *10 (quoting Debit Card Interchange Fees and
Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,725 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
235)).
9. See FED. RESERVE SYS., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH
PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2009 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE
PAYMENTS STUDY], available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_
payments_study.pdf.
10. Anisha, Tester-Corker Durbin Amendment Delay Falls Short, NERDWALLET (June 8,
2011), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/2011/tester-corker-durbin-amendment-delay-falls-short/.
11. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *8 (“On December 16, 2010, pursuant to
subsection (a)(3), the Board issued proposed regulations, presented two alternatives as to
interchange rates, and asked for comments as to which alternative it should adopt. In short, one
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and final regulations on June 29, 2011,12 about two months after they were
due; the rates went into force on October 1, 2011, instead of July 21, 2011,
as had been originally planned.13 The initial set of regulations called for a
debit interchange rate that would under no circumstances exceed twelve
cents per transaction, a sharp decline from the forty-seven cents per
transaction under the unregulated rate regime.14 The final regulations,
issued after the TCF challenge was turned aside by the Eighth Circuit,
roughly doubled the twelve-cent figure, providing that “an issuer may not
receive or charge an interchange transaction fee in excess of the sum of a
21-cent base component and 5 basis points of the transaction’s value (the
ad valorem component).”15
On April 25, 2011, Judge Lawrence L. Piersol of the District Court of
South Dakota handed down a decision that held that TCF’s facial challenge
to the statute was not ripe for adjudication, so no preliminary injunction
should issue.16 That decision was affirmed, for essentially the same
reasons, by the Eighth Circuit on June 29, 2011.17 The first point in both
decisions was that TCF was not entitled to any protections afforded to
public utilities, which are subject to systems of rate regulation. Judge
Piersol put the point as follows:
Under Minnesota Association of Health Care Facilities v.
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, rational basis
review applies to this challenge because TCF’s offering of
debit cards is not required by the government, nor is Plaintiff
engaged in the type of “continuous production of output for
the benefit of the public” that commentators have identified as
the hallmark of a classic utility. Likewise, there is no
monopoly power assumed to be associated with issuing debit
cards. Plaintiff is not a public utility under rate case
jurisprudence. The case law relied upon by Plaintiff is

proposal allowed a safe harbor of 7¢ per transaction, but no more than 12¢ if an issuer could show
ACS costs in excess of 7¢; the alternative was a flat rate of 12¢. The Board found that current
interchange was about 44¢ for an average-sized transaction. Thus it is clear that TCF will
experience a revenue reduction under the proposed alternatives.”).
12. BD. OF GOVERNERS, FED. RESERVE SYS., DOCKET NO. R-1404, DRAFT OF FINAL RULE:
DEBIT CARD INTERCHANGE FEES AND ROUTING 343 (June 2011) [hereinafter
FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/board
meetings/20110629_REG_II_FR_NOTICE.FINAL_DRAFT.06_22_2011.pdf.
13. Id. at 37–38.
14. Id. at 48; see also ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR, ASSESSING RETAILERS’ COSTS AND BENEFITS
FROM ACCEPTING DEBIT CARDS 17 (2011).
15. Id.
16. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *14.
17. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF II), 643 F.3d 1158, 1165 (8th Cir. 2011).
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therefore inapplicable to its due process claim.18
Accordingly, the level of review of government action is conducted on
the “highly deferential” rational basis test, which requires the claimant to
show that the government has acted in an “arbitrary and irrational way”:
“Price control is unconstitutional if arbitrary, discriminatory, or
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt.”19
The rational basis test was also relevant to the second of the
government’s arguments—that TCF could not show that it had a
protectable interest, given that Visa had the “unmitigated” right to change
its rate structure at will:
Although TCF has an expectation regarding future debit
interchange fees based on its contract with Visa, TCF is
unlikely to prevail on its due process claim because Visa
retains unmitigated discretion to set debit interchange fees and
there is no statutory or contractual provision guaranteeing
TCF a certain level of interchange income. Fees associated
with payment transactions initiated by bank customers have
also been historically subject to regulation and market
pressures beyond TCF’s control.20
The government’s third argument was that the system of rate regulation
only covered the funds that TCF could receive from merchants through the
debit card system, but did not cover the amounts that it could receive by
charging its own customers, which amounts must be taken into account in
order to determine whether the rates in question are confiscatory.
Since TCF is free under the Durbin Amendment to assess
fees on its customers to offset any losses under the Durbin
Amendment, we are skeptical that the Durbin Amendment has
even created a sufficient price control on TCF’s debit-card
business so as to trigger a confiscatory-rate analysis or that the
law could, in fact, produce a confiscatory rate.21
Accordingly, under the stringent standards applicable to issuing
preliminary injunctions, the case was dismissed.22
18. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12–13 (citing Minn. Ass’n of Health Care
Facilities v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984)).
19. TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
20. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *14.
21. TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1164.
22. Both courts used the standard tests for preliminary injunctions. The appellate court stated:
In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction against a duly enacted
statute, the district court must consider: (1) whether the movant is “likely to
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The short opinions of both the district and appellate courts make it
appear that TCF’s suit was just one more on the forlorn list of misguided
challenges to the government’s power to set rates and control prices.
However, virtually every statement that is treated as unquestioned truth in
these two opinions is in fact wrong, and demonstrably so. First, by creating
the Durbin Paradox, the two TCF decisions get matters exactly backwards
by insisting that because there is “no monopoly power” in banks that issue
debit cards, the government has more, rather than less, power to regulate
these entities.23 So long as these companies have made fixed investments
in the ground, they are entitled to the same protection against confiscatory
rates as public utilities because they are subject to the same risk of
government abuse. Second, the want of any firm contract with Visa is no
more relevant to TCF’s constitutional rights than the want of every public
utility with its own clients. In both cases, the parties to these agreements
take business risks between themselves but do not assume the risks of
forcible intervention with their prospective advantage by forces beyond
their control. Third, the question is not whether the regulated banks can
receive some additional compensation from their own customers, as they
surely can. Rather, the question is whether TCF is entitled to an injunction
when there is no showing that this compensation will, or even could, equal
the position that the companies had before the statute was imposed. Unless
the government can show that its compensation is full and complete, it
cannot go ahead with the regulation.24 And once the structure of the
industry is understood, it is clear that the compensation recoverable under
the Durbin Amendment in this instance falls far short of that required
under the Constitution.
prevail on the merits”; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (3) the
state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will
inflict on other parties litigant; and (4) the public interest.
TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1162 (citing and quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530
F.3d 724, 729 n.3, 733 (8th Cir. 2008), and citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d
109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). The district court similarly noted:
[T]he Court [must] examine first the likelihood that TCF will prevail on the merits
of its claim that the statute is unconstitutional before the Court applies the
remaining three factors of a preliminary injunction analysis: (1) whether Plaintiff
will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (2) any harm to other
interested parties, and (3) the effect on the public interest.
TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 729 n.3, 731 (8th Cir. 2008); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640
F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)).
23. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12; TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1164–65.
24. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325–26 (1893)
(defining “just compensation” in the context of government takings as “a full and perfect equivalent
of the property taken”).
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The development of an alternative approach to these issues requires a
far more systematic account of these three points. First, one must give
some account of the way in which these debit transactions were organized
before the passage of the Durbin Amendment. Part I of this Article
therefore seeks to determine 1) whether this organization represents an
exercise of monopoly power (either by the debit card companies or their
member banks, or both), or 2) whether such organization was actually an
efficient way to handle interchange in the current network industry
situation (that situation being one in which the requirement for
interconnection makes it impossible to have pure competitive solutions
because firms must cooperate in the set-up in order to compete). Part I
concludes that the second efficiency explanation is correct and that the
attempt to find subtle influences of monopoly power on debit transaction
organization is not credible.
Part II examines the provisions of the Durbin Amendment, which were
explicitly justified—both by Senator Dick Durbin and the merchants who
supported them—by the view that the monopoly account of debit card
markets was correct. Part II explores the various mechanisms used to
regulate banks and the exemptions that are afforded under the Amendment
for small banks, defined as those that have less than $10 billion in bank
assets.25 That group of smaller banks covers all but sixty banks and three
credit unions in the United States, out of about 7,000 banks and 7,000
credit unions total. Those larger institutions, however, hold the vast
majority of total bank assets.26
Part III then uses the information in Parts I and II to conduct a
constitutional inquiry, which will necessarily face far higher hurdles if the
antimonopoly rationale for the Amendment holds than it will if the
efficiency explanation offered by the industry’s defenders, and this Article,
is correct. Accordingly, under the current tests for rate regulation, this
Article argues that in principle—no matter what the regulated rates set by
the Federal Reserve—the Durbin Act is unconstitutional.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF DEBIT CARD TRANSACTION
The Durbin Amendment regulates debit card interchange fees27—the
fees that merchants, through “acquiring,” pay for processing debit
transactions through Visa and MasterCard, which then remit some fraction
of these payments to the banks that issued debit cards to their own
25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 723(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1680 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
26. A Repository of Financial Data and Institution Characteristics Collected by the Federal
Reserve System, NATIONAL INFORMATION CENTER (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpub
web/nicweb/top50form.aspx.
27. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1075, § 920(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2068.
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customers.28 Before the Durbin Amendment, interchange fees for debit
card use were set by the coordination of the activities of the five central
players in the system: the cardholder, the bank that issued the card to that
person, the network platform, the merchant bank, and the merchant.29 At
the center of the system sits the credit card company, which operates at the
nexus between the customer and the merchant. The two most essential
parties in this system are Visa and MasterCard, which have a combined
share of about 83% of debit card transactions, with Visa having a 66%
market share and MasterCard having the remaining 17%.30 Other smaller
operations control the rest of the business; however, debit cards occupy
only part of the payments system, which includes an ever broadening set of
payment methods—PayPal, mobile phone payments, prepaid cards, and the
like.31
On one side of this payment platform are the customers who acquire
their debit or credit cards from a bank. There is a direct contract between
the customer and the bank, and that contract may include a variety of fees
that the customer has to pay the bank for services, including charges for
defaulting on payment obligations. As the market was organized prior to
the passage of the Durbin Amendment, retail customers did not pay any
interchange fees for the use of their debit cards, which they received for
free. On the other side of the interchange platform is the retailer, who
usually works though a merchant bank to secure connections to the
platform operator, and through that platform operator to the customer and
the customer’s bank. The retailers and their merchant banks negotiate a
contract for the services that the bank renders to the retailer, the cost of
which will vary with the level of services that the retailer furnishes to itself
and those furnished by the bank.
A representative set of numbers reads as follows, starting with a $100
debit transaction by a consumer. On a $100 transaction, the merchant
receives back approximately $97.20. The issuing bank retains roughly
$1.70 and around $0.50 is retained by the merchant or acquiring bank for
the debit card company.32
The organization of this network takes place without any direct
negotiations between the merchants on the one side of the platform and the
issuing banks on the other. Rather, the rates between Visa and MasterCard
and the various merchants are indeed negotiated rates, which depend on the
quality of the debit card information and the volume of services that the
28. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 60–61.
29. See id. at 356 n.199.
30. STEVEN C. SALOP ET AL., MERCHS. PAYMENTS COAL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEBIT CARD
REGULATION UNDER SECTION 920 10 (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/files/merchants_payment_coalition_meeting_20101102.pdf.
31. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 124.
32. See generally LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 14.
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merchant supplies to the platform operator. These rates are typically below
1% for large retailers like Wal-Mart, and are far more expensive (even five
or six times as high) for smaller retailers that present greater operational
challenges and default risks to the banks.33 On the other side, Visa and
MasterCard negotiate standard fees with issuing banks, which fees
represent what the banks are paid for the services they rendered to
merchants and customers. In addition, the platform operator takes its own
small cut on each transaction. In essence, once a merchant bill is presented
to the issuing bank, that bank takes the appropriate sums out of the debit
card holder accounts, keeps its own fee, and passes on the remainder of the
money, first to the platform operator (which takes its own slice) and then to
the acquiring or merchant bank.34
The distinctive feature of this system is the interchange fee that goes
over the network from merchant to customer. The key question asks what
function these fees serve. Here, the simplest explanation for the current fee
structure is that it allows the issuing banks and Visa and MasterCard to
provide several services of value to the merchants. To be sure, merchant
groups often claim that these debit card transactions are just the equivalent
of checks,35 which generally clear “at par,” meaning that the person to
whom a check is made out receives the face value of the check. But one
reason that debit transactions do not clear at par is that, in fact, they serve
important additional functions, summarized by Anne Layne-Farrar, a TCF
consultant, as follows:
Thus far in the debate over the Durbin Amendment, to the
best of my knowledge, retailers have focused solely on bank
card transaction fees and have not acknowledged that cards
may provide benefits that offset those bank fees. For instance,
card payments can often be processed faster than cash, and are
certainly faster than a check, which means retailers save labor
time at the checkout station, save consumers time for their
33. See, e.g., VISA, VISA U.S.A. INTERCHANGE REIMBURSEMENT FEES (2011), available at
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-usa-interchange-reimbursement-fees-october2011.pdf.
34. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dangerous Experiment of the Durbin Amendment, REG.:
CATO REV. BUS. & GOV’T, Spring 2011, at 24, 26–27, for further description.
35. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the Retail Litigation Center, Inc. in Support of
Appellees and Affirmance of the District Court Order at 4, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d
1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011) (No. 11-1805), 2011 WL 2003118 [hereinafter RLC Brief] (“Debit
cards, like checks, are merely an access device to consumers’ asset accounts, usually a checking or
demand deposit account (DDA). TCF admits as much: ‘Today, one cannot separate out the debit
service from a checking account.’ TCF even refers to its debit cards as ‘check cards,’ as did Visa
when it first marketed debit cards.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Amended Complaint at para. 48,
TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *14 (D.S.D. Apr.
25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011), and News Release, TCF Bank, TCF Bank
Announces Checking Product Enhancements and Introduces Mobile Banking (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://ir.tcfexpress.com/phoenix. zhtml?c=95289&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1513371&highlight=)).
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own checkout as well as in line behind others. In addition,
debit cards do not involve cash in the till and thus lower
retailers’ risk of employee theft or break in. Unlike checks,
debit cards provide merchants (following the prescribed steps)
with guaranteed payment. Moreover, debit cards can offer
retailers direct benefits, such as increased incremental
customer spending. 36
It is worth explaining her conclusions in a bit more detail. The check is
a “dumb” piece of paper that does not integrate easily with merchant
computer systems and thus does not supply merchants with instant
information of value in their own business. Use only a check, and it will
not add anything to the merchant’s knowledge of the financial position of
the customer. The check, moreover, offers a slower form of payment,
which reduces the flow of customers through checkout lines, which in turn
increases the cost of processing these transactions. Even though checkimaging systems today make it unnecessary to ship checks back and forth
across the country, those record-keeping devices do not allow for
instantaneous examination of bank balances and credit histories while the
customer is waiting in the checkout line. The risk of bad checks, moreover,
remains with the retailer because the bank at the time and place of service
has no direct means to determine whether the customer has sufficient funds
to cover that transaction in his demand deposit account, formerly known as
a checking account. (The new name reflects that the payments from this
account are usually not made by checks, whose use, both by number and by
dollar amount, has decreased sharply in recent years.)37
In dealing with this issue, it is critical to note that there is always a risk
component with respect to debit card payments because it often makes
good business sense for banks to allow customers to overdraw their
accounts at the end of the month if they are confident that the next
paycheck will cover the expenditure. The algorithms used to make these
judgments are not perfect, such that putting the risk of loss on the bank for
the debit payments it has authorized offers an effective bonding device for
the reliability of the system. As with all warranties, the outsider does not
need to understand how its trading partner works, so long as it receives a
full warranty against its losses. This warranty is relatively easy to arrange
for liquidated sums, against which a premium can provide adequate
insurance; this is what happens whenever merchants electronically make
contact with the bank, which immediately authorizes the payment, then
clears and settles the transaction. The superior information available to the
bank thus makes it rational for it to assume the risk of default—a risk that
36. LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 14, at 3. Layne-Farrar’s report provides a detailed discussion
of, with an effort to quantify, net benefits. See generally id.
37. See 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 9, at 7–8.
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is one of the elements of expense covered by interchange fees that
merchants pay to issuing banks. Yet these residual risks can still be high:
as the Federal Reserve notes, “comparable service for checks costs
merchants 1.5 percent of the transaction value,”38 a figure which is
somewhat reduced for debit card transactions, with their superior
monitoring.
In addition, the convenience of debit cards means that individual
customers carry less cash; there is corresponding evidence of “ticket lift,”
which means that customers tend to make larger purchases on debit cards
than they do with cash, ranging from 5% to 20% of the purchase price.
Visa and MasterCard also both promote their own brands, which brings
more customers into the system, and the banks promote their own
individual cards, which brings more customers to each merchant—another
benefit of the cards.39
In assessing the uses of debit cards, these benefits to the merchant must
be offset against its interchange fee. As a matter of basic economic theory,
it is obvious that both customers and merchants benefit from this high
volume of debit transactions. Nonetheless, that position is frequently urged
by merchants40 who purport to identify a market failure on the customer
side because they do not have an explicit breakdown of debit interchange
fees, which if known would lead to major protests. This information is
publicly available,41 but in most cases, the rational customer’s first order of
business is to compare the value of the goods and services received against
the amount charged for them. Once the value received is greater than the
cost, there is no more reason to inquire into the amount that goes to debit
interchange than there is to ask what fraction of the sale price goes to
overhead, service, and the cost of goods. None of that information will
alter the basic decision point. To be sure, consumers would love to have
lower prices, but they do not need full disclosure to push them down that
favorable path. Let any firm raise prices so that they do not reflect
underlying costs, and other firms with lower costs will fill the void. No
consumer knows the cost of each component of a new computer, but
competition for overall sales drives the price of the equipment down to the
cost of production, as in other markets. It is not credible to find any form
of market failure, let alone fraud or deception, in the failure to disclose
information that no one wants.
Nor is the ultimate analysis different when we look at the other side of
the market. It strains credulity to think that the likes of McDonald’s resorts
38. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 54.
39. LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 14, at 11–14.
40. Credit Card Interchange Fees: Hearing Before the Antitrust Task Force of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Antitrust
Task Force), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ printers/110th/36785.pdf.
41. See, e.g., 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 9.
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to debit cards in desperation even though it loses money on the transaction
relative to other payment forms. Rather, the continued use of these cards in
all segments of the economy, including quick service restaurants, is
powerful evidence to the contrary.42 The theory of revealed preferences is
too clear. As Kevin M. Murphy, a TCF expert, wrote: “It is highly unusual,
indeed perhaps unprecedented, to focus regulatory scrutiny and
intervention on a segment of the economy that all participants have
voluntarily and enthusiastically embraced, and that has grown faster than
and substantially displaced competing products or services.”43
Yet that inference is passionately resisted by the retailers who claim
that “[b]ecause the RLC’s members must accept debit cards to remain
competitive, they have had no choice but to pay these fees.”44 The point is
absurd on its face. If these transactions cost more than they are worth, all
retailers should regain the high ground by spurning debit cards and offering
lower prices to customers, who should happily be willing to pay with cash
or check. But of course, the reason that they do not is that the implicit costs
to consumers (in terms of their time and cost) is higher with cash and
check, so consumers prefer the same mechanism that is cheaper for the
retailers using these services. There has been extensive debate in the
literature as to which form of payment subsidizes which other forms of
payment, but that debate is ultimately futile.45 Murphy has rightly noted
that some form of cross-subsidy is ubiquitous in all retail markets, if only
because some customers rely more on the help of sales staff than others.46
In general, it is difficult to charge separately for these services, so these
imbalances are handled in more subtle ways, like walking away from
42. See id. at 15–19.
43. Report of Professor Kevin M. Murphy at 3, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45059 (D.S.D. Feb. 15, 2011) (No. CIV 10-4149), 2011 WL 863916 [hereinafter Murphy
Report].
44. RLC Brief, supra note 35, at 1.
45. For a demolition of the cross-subsidy claim with respect to gasoline purchases, see Steven
Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Tax the
Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 419 (2009), which concluded:
Although the best available evidence indicates that merchants pay more out-ofpocket to accept credit cards than they do for other forms of payment, these costs
are only half the story. Credit cards provide significant benefits to merchants that
could outweigh the incrementally higher out-of-pocket costs and thus lead to
lower retail prices. Although the evidence is inconclusive, credit card acceptance
appears to make all consumers better off than they would be if the particular
merchants with whom they deal did not accept cards.
Id. at 421–22 (footnote omitted). The same observations can be made about debit cards.
For an analytical demolition of the point, see Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 30–31, noting
that any analysis that looks only at some costs and benefits, while ignoring all others is “completely
one sided.”
46. Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 31–32.
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customers who take up too much time.
The real question is whether these retail institutions can tolerate
systematic cross-subsidies that do, in fact, create distortions among
customer classes. Where these show up in substantial form, a merchant has
an incentive to introduce differential pricing, if that could be implemented
at a low enough cost. If debit cards were subsidized by cash and check
customers, we should see merchants move to eliminate the subsidies in
order to increase their customer base. Yet the reverse is actually true. We
also know that all cross-subsidies are necessarily eliminated if debit and
credit cards drive out cash and checks; this is the case with some airlines
that will take only plastic for onboard transactions. More generally, the
relative decline in the use of cash and checks makes it very hard to say that
a smaller fraction of payment transactions subsidize the rest, when it could
easily go in the opposite direction. The proper mix of payment systems for
any given firm is difficult to predict in the abstract. Some small outfits take
only cash, while others refuse to take cash or checks. Some accept multiple
forms of payment, but may steer customers to one form of payment relative
to another. These differences do not, however, supply evidence of some
pervasive form of market failure. They show only that “different strokes
for different folks” is appropriate for payment systems, as it is for just
about every other feature of doing business.
It is, therefore, simply not tenable to accept the merchant contention
that huge businesses use operations on which they lose money, when other
options are available to them. Nonetheless, the rapid expansion of the debit
card industry could still be consistent with the view that monopolization on
the other side of the industry has made the use of debit (and credit) cards
more expensive for merchants than would have been the case in a pure
competitive market. In fact, much of the criticism against the debit card
structure is that it in fact does facilitate monopoly practices. Once again,
the RLC brief shows how the argument is made in a judicial setting:
“[N]etworks like Visa fix the price of interchange for TCF and its rival
issuing banks, and then [use] their market power [to force] merchants to
accept debit cards with . . . anticompetitively high interchange fees.”47
These remarks are consistent with the same charges that have been levied
against the debit card companies and the banks in Congressional testimony.
Mallory Duncan, the General Counsel of the NRF, states that charge
baldly: “Visa and MasterCard . . . are cartels whose members set the fees
they will charge and all agree to charge the same fees.”48 Indeed, as the
government notes in its brief, both banks and merchants have a similar
47. RLC Brief, supra note 35, at 13.
48. Credit Card Interchange Fees: Hearing Before the Antitrust Task Force of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. 54 (2007) (statement of Mallory Duncan, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, National Retail Federation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
printers/110th/36785.PDF.
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relationship to the credit card companies. Thus, in speaking of TCF, it
observes that “[n]othing in plaintiff’s contract with Visa guarantees any
minimum interchange fee or even limits the circumstances in which Visa
can reduce the fee schedule,”49 which, while true, hardly shows that credit
card companies and banks are in cahoots.
What is clearly lacking in these broad denunciations is a coherent
account of some antitrust violation. For starters, if there were indeed
cartels that operated in violation of the antitrust laws, the merchants would
not need to apply to Congress for any special relief under the Durbin
Amendment. Instead, they could simply file a complaint under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, taking advantage of what is essentially a per se rule
with respect to cartel behavior and obtaining treble damages and perhaps
some form of injunctive relief.50 Yet to this point, no merchant has
attempted to file a suit of that sort. Indeed, the successful antitrust actions
(the merits of which could be disputed) take exactly the opposite form.
They seek to attack particular practices that each of these networks have
undertaken unilaterally to show that they create, for example, some type of
illegal tie-in arrangement.51
At this juncture, it is necessary to inquire how the cartel theory applies
to Visa and MasterCard when they try to organize their vertical
relationships with their own customers. It is agreed on all sides that there is
no coordinated effort by the banks to set interchange rates. Indeed, as the
RLC notes in connection with TCF, the evidence is unambiguous that it
and all other Visa banks are rate-takers rather than rate-makers. As RLC
states, “Debit networks fix the price of interchange for rival issuers, and
can change it at will,”52 and furthermore these debit “[n]etworks have used
market power to force merchants to accept these high interchange fees that

49. Brief for Appellees at 16, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29,
2011) (No. 11-1805) [hereinafter Brief for Government].
50. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).
51. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506–07,
(E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
2005), cert. denied sub nom. Leonardo’s Pizza by the Slice, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 544 U.S.
1044 (2005). The stated value of the settlement was $2 billion against Visa and $1 billion against
MasterCard, but those figures do not correct for discounting. The actual practice attacked in those
cases was the decision to tie the use of signature debit to PIN debit at various retail outlets. Id. at
507–08. In general the direct costs of PIN debit are lower than those of signature debit, but there is
a large level of consumer resistance to PIN debit (especially since the theft of PIN numbers could
result in fraud when the card is used elsewhere). In fact, only a handful of establishments have taken
advantage of the option to break the tie, given the division of consumer sentiment on the issue. It
seems incredulous for the RLF to claim that settlement contained “injunctive relief ‘result[ing] in
future savings to the Class valued from approximately $25 to $87 billion or more.’” RLC Brief,
supra note 35, at 14 n.39 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Visa Check, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 511–
12).
52. RLC Brief, supra note 35, at 7.
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are unrelated to costs.”53 The critics of the industry take the point one step
further when they note that the contracts Visa uses do not confer any strong
rights on their member banks, given that Visa can simply change the
rates.54
The question is how best to read this information. One way is to say
that Visa takes it upon itself to create a cartel for the various banks it seeks
to attract as customers. Yet one must pause to ask whether there could be
any efficiency justification for the practice that would block the application
of a per se denunciation. In this context, there clearly is, given the central
role that both Visa and MasterCard play in the organization of a network
industry. To see why this is the case, just assume for the moment that Visa
and MasterCard did not exert any influence to standardize prices. At that
point, just how would these debit interchange fees be determined? The
answer is only at a far higher transaction cost. The point here bears directly
on the question of antitrust liability because it is always a fair question to
ask whether some supposed risk of monopolization presents a greater peril
to market operation than the risk of a system paralysis brought on because
the transaction costs are so high that they exceed the joint gain for all
parties. In a world in which there are upwards of 5,000,000 retailers and
7,000 banks,55 one-on-one negotiations are a dead loser for all parties.
Hence, the intermediary sets the rates on both ends, passing on the savings
to both parties and to the consumers who operate on both sides of the
market.
The key question therefore becomes this: just how are these rates set?
To answer this question, the retailers hired Professor Steven Salop of the
Georgetown University Law Center, who urged that all debit interchange
fees be abolished, so that these transactions, like checks, cleared at par. He
noted that the Canadian interchange system was set up this way from the
outset and that it could be a viable model for dealing with the exchange
problem in the United States.56 His reason for wanting this system is that
he feared that the dynamics of these markets were such that Visa and
MasterCard would find it in their interest to push rates to the banks as high
as they could in order to attract their customers. Professor Salop
concluded:
The fact that Visa and MasterCard have market power
over merchants, but compete for issuers, implies that they
have strong incentives to exploit their market power over
merchants in order to subsidize issuers. This dynamic has
53. Id. at 9.
54. VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS: CORE PRINCIPLES 10 (2010),
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulationscore.pdf.
55. See In re Visa Check, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 522–24.
56. SALOP ET AL., supra note 30, at 24–26.
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resulted in high interchange fees that are paid by merchants
and received by issuers.57
Yet this statement, repeated many times in the study, conceals more
than it raises. The initial question is why it is that Visa and MasterCard
have market power only over the merchants and not over the banks. That
position possibly made some sense when Visa and MasterCard were each
run by a coalition of large banks, even as they supplied their services to a
larger banking community. But it was precisely to avoid the antitrust risk
associated with this behavior that MasterCard converted itself into an
independent entity in 2007, and Visa followed in 2008. The rates charged
in these cases did not change much with this reorganization. The reason
why one profit-making entity should shower goods on another is not fully
explained.
The second point is that it is hard to understand what the equilibrium
price is under this model. Each time the interchange rates are raised with
respect to the merchants by, say, Visa, it presents a profit opportunity for
MasterCard to keep or even trim its rates, in order to persuade merchants to
steer their customers in their direction. It would be devastating for either
Visa or MasterCard to find that some large establishments would refuse to
take its purchasers, especially when many customers carry both types of
cards. Indeed, it is for that reason that the two companies compete up and
down the market. The entire market is not as stable as the market shares
suggest, for if either Visa, MasterCard, or both raised their rates, the fringe
players could start to compete for a larger share of the marketplace under
the price umbrella these firms create. The assertion of monopoly power
that comes from the true claim that the merchants would very much like to
take all cards may nudge rates above the competitive level, but if so, it is
not clear by how much. Nor is it possible to think of any pricing pairing
mechanism that would not be worse than the condition that it is intended to
cure.
In making these claims about the peculiar structure of the market,
Salop notes, correctly, that the distinctive feature of debit card markets is
that they are two-sided markets.58 A two-sided market is not one in which
there are just buyers and sellers, of course; by that definition, all markets
would be two-sided. Rather, the term applies to markets in which there are
least three parties to the transaction, where the middle party (here, Visa and
MasterCard) is there to make sure that the two opposing sides are willing
to do business with each other. Kevin Murphy, in his written testimony on
behalf of TCF, notes that in a two-sided market, the ability to attract
customers on one side of the market depends on the ability to attract those
customers to the other side of the market. The most obvious illustrations of
57. Id. at 1–2.
58. See SALOP ET AL., supra note 30, at 12–13.
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this are dating services, which try to attract the right proportion of men and
women, and dining services, such as Groupon, which must match
restaurants with customers. The point is that someone has to pay the fees to
operate the matching services, and in these markets, the fees are not
typically borne equally by both sides of the market, but rather are paid from
one side of the market. With dating services, therefore, men pay higher
rates in order to attract the relative paucity of women, and with food
services, the payments come from the restaurants, which are anxious to fill
empty tables. In all of these situations, the payment systems, in effect,
introduce a conscious cross-subsidy across the two sides of the market so
that the parties on the less elastic (that is, price-sensitive) side of the
market pay some money over to the other side in order to keep the market
alive.59
The key mistake in Salop’s argument is that at no point does he address
the potential efficiency gains that arise from these cross-market payments
in two-sided markets—even when, as with restaurants and bars, none of
the participants to the organization contain any element of monopoly
power. Yet the theoretical foundation for this position is well laid out in
the late Professor William F. Baxter’s classic article on the question.60 The
clear implication of Professor Baxter’s article is that, wholly apart from
monopoly exploitation, there is a strong efficiency explanation as to why
payments across network platforms improve the operation of the overall
system. This explanation is cumulative with the transaction cost
explanation given above, insofar as it offers an additional reason why the
markets here converge to a competitive equilibrium. Whether this is
perfect convergence is impossible to say, but there is nonetheless a good
reason to think that the Murphy Report assesses the situation correctly
when it concludes, “[P]roponents of debit regulation have not identified
any market failure that justifies intervention, because there are none.”61 It
is rare to find any industry that is perfectly competitive and it is always
possible to postulate that any shortfall in information or transparency
counts as a market failure. But even if the Murphy conclusion goes a bit
too far, it is clear that the explosive growth and widespread acceptance of
debit cards exhibit the signs of a vibrant, highly competitive industry, not
one that is in need of a comprehensive overhaul. There is no cartel in
operation and no natural monopoly—a point that becomes critical later on
in the constitutional analysis.

59. Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 11–12, 15–17, 26 n.80.
60. William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic
Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541, 541–43 (1983).
61. Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 2.
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II. THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
The subject of debit interchange received extensive general discussion
before the passage of the Durbin Amendment. Thus, there were many
studies of the topic by the various banks in the Federal Reserve System,
hearings on the topic before various committees in the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate, and a large academic literature devoted to
various aspects of the topic. In that large body of material, not a single
syllable can be located addressing the highly specific proposal that was
incorporated into Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Senator Durbin introduced the eponymous Durbin Amendment late
amid the extensive deliberations over the Dodd-Frank legislation.62 During
his well-known floor speech on the Amendment, he repeated many of the
arguments examined above, to the effect that his legislation was needed to
help small businesses escape the dominant market position of the banks, so
that these businesses could take the money that they spend on debit
interchange and devote it to lowering prices and creating jobs.63 In
particular, the Senator relied on the private statements of the head of a
major corporation (subsequently identified as Greg Wasson, the CEO of
Walgreens64) that interchange fees were too high because they were the
fourth largest item on the corporation’s books, after salaries, plant, and
health care.65 During the course of the floor debate, the Senator constantly
stressed that the costs of running a debit card system were only a small
fraction of the debit interchange fees.66
The legislation that Senator Durbin pushed was adopted in response to
these elements. The Amendment did not take Professor Salop’s position
eliminating all interchange fees, but it did instruct the Federal Reserve to
“consider the functional similarity” to “checking transactions that are
required within the Federal Reserve bank system to clear at par.”67
Immediately preceding this instruction, the Amendment prescribed that
interchange fees had to be “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred
62. 156 CONG. REC. S3624–25 (daily ed. May 12, 2010); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3040–41
(daily ed. May 3, 2010).
63. 156 CONG. REC. S3129–30 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin);
see also 156 CONG. REC. S3696–97 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
64. See 156 CONG. REC. S3455 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin)
(relating conversation with “the CEO of Walgreens”); Gregory D. Wasson, WALGREENS,
http://news.walgreens.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1099 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
65. 156 CONG. REC. 3130 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
66. See 156 CONG. REC. S3695–96 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard
Durbin); 156 CONG. REC. S3588–89 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin);
156 CONG. REC. S3455–56 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); 156
CONG. REC. S3130 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
67. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 1075, § 920(a)(4)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(A) (West 2010)).
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by the issuer with respect to the transaction.”68 The terms “reasonable” and
“proportional” were not to be read in isolation, but in turn received their
own statutory definitions, which provided that, in issuing its regulation, the
Federal Reserve must differentiate between:
(i) the incremental cost incurred by an issuer for the role
of the issuer in the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a
particular electronic debit transaction . . . ; and (ii) other costs
incurred by an issuer which are not specific to a particular
electronic debit transaction . . . .69
The implicit subtext of these provisions is that the banks can recoup the
revenues they lose in debit interchange from their own customers, in the
terms of higher rates for the various services they supply.
Left as a general provision, the Durbin Amendment lacked sufficient
votes in the Senate, until Senator Durbin agreed to allow a small-bank
exemption from the interchange fees. In his original draft, “small” banks
included only banks that had assets of less than a billion dollars.70 When
the bill came up short, he substituted this for ten billion, after which the
bill passed.71 Add a zero and the job was done. Yet at no point in these
frantic machinations did anyone make any effort to discuss the impact that
the major changes in debit interchange would have on the long-term
stability of the system, or the impact that the exemption of the small banks
would have on the balance of advantage over debit card accounts. TCF
chose to sue because, at $18 billion, it was too large to count as a small
bank. Yet it was also heavily invested in its debit card business, which was
in direct competition with smaller banks that were nearby all of TCF’s
locations.72 At the same time, TCF had no credit card business to which it
could shift its customers, as earlier efforts to reach that market failed in
light of TCF’s position as a retail bank serving many middle- and lowincome customers, with high turnover and default rates.73 It is worth noting
that the class of banks considered “large” under the Amendment is quite
broad, as the three largest banks in the United States, which run highly
diversified operations, are Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and

68. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1075, § 920(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2068 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693o-2(a)(2)).
69. Id. § 920(a)(4)(B)(i)–(ii), 124 Stat. at 2068–69 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o2(a)(4)(B)).
70. 156 CONG. REC. S3040-41 (daily ed. May 3, 2010).
71. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1075, § 920(a)(6)(A), 124 Stat. at 2070 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A)).
72. Brief of Appellant TCF National Bank at 9–10, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d
1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011) (No. 11-1805).
73. Amended Complaint at 10, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059
(D.S.D. 2011) (No. CIV 10-4149).
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Citibank, all with assets at or over $2 trillion dollars,74 and all of which are
more than a hundred times TCF’s size. These differences illustrate that a
statute like the Durbin Amendment could easily have a vastly differential
effect on the various parties whom it governs.
The Durbin Amendment took effect on October 1, 2011.75 In the days
leading up to its implementation different banks announced that they
would put different kinds of fees on debit card use, most notably the $5 per
month fee that Bank of America thought was needed to restore its financial
position, which is already subject to severe attack. There is also ample
evidence that many banks will pull back on various services in order to rein
in costs, knowing that under the current rate structure they are expected to
lose about $6.6 billion a year in debit card fees.76 Yet, although much is
now known, there remains much uncertainty as to how deeply it will cut
into the operation of the debit markets and as to how important the small
bank exemption will prove in influencing customers to move. The most
notable development is that, in its long final report, the Federal Reserve
gave an expansive reading to the allowable costs, which did not limit these
only to the costs of authorizing, clearing, and settling individual
transactions. Instead, the Federal Reserve adopted a far broader rule, noting
that “[i]n establishing the standard, the Board included all types of costs
incurred by the issuer to effect an electronic debit transaction for which
reliable data were available to the Board through its survey or through
comments.”77
The point of this Article is not to examine whether this broad reading is
correct, although it is not. Rather, it is to deal with the constitutional issues
of the statute, on the assumption that the rules adopted by the Federal
Reserve should be treated as though they were explicitly inserted into the
statute. With these understandings in place, Part III will now address the
constitutional challenges to the Durbin Amendment. I stress at the outset
that these are my own views and do not necessarily represent the position
of TCF National Bank or indeed any of the many parties who have such a
deep interest in the litigation.

74. Top 50 Bank Holding Companies Summary Page, NAT’L INFO. CENTER,
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/nichome.aspx (last updated Sept. 30, 2011).
75. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 37.
76. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard & Ben Protess, Banks to Make Customers Pay Fee for
Using Debit Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at A1.
77. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 74 (emphasis added).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS CLAIMS AND THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
A. The Case for Strict Scrutiny
Both opinions in the TCF litigation opted for the rational basis test,78 as
if it were the only possible standard that could apply to the case. In so
doing, neither the Eighth Circuit nor the district court cited or discussed the
rate regulation cases governing public utilities, even though these cases
were prominently featured in TCF’s briefs.79 Instead, both opinions
immediately adopted the due process test that is used in many price control
settings, including those schemes used for dairy products80 and rent
control.81
It is a common understanding among constitutional scholars that the
outcome of a particular constitutional challenge depends heavily on the
standard of review that is brought to a case. In approaching this question,
current law has articulated three standards of review that, with many
gradations, dominate constitutional law: (a) strict scrutiny of the statute or
regulation, (b) intermediate scrutiny, and (c) rational basis review, which
allows the legislature great deference.
The best way to understand the difference among these tests is to ask
which errors of what magnitude the court is prepared to tolerate in the
administration of the law. Under a strict scrutiny regime, the law attaches
great weight to the constitutional claim and therefore tolerates only a low
rate of error before invalidating the law. At the opposite extreme, the errors
necessary to warrant invalidation under rational basis review are thought to
be quite high. It is therefore the case that in all disputes, a more favorable
standard of review for the challenger can increase by an order of magnitude
the likelihood that a constitutional challenge will be successful.
On this issue, it is important to note the four-part classification in the
current takings and economic liberties literature that frames the debate. At
one extreme lie the rules dealing with the physical occupation of property,
for which there is a virtually per se obligation on the part of the
government to compensate, no matter for what purpose the property is
used.82 At the other extreme, most especially in land use cases, the standard
of review is set by the critical Supreme Court decision in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,83 which self-consciously
78. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059,
at *12–13 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011); TCF Nat’l Bank v.
Bernanke (TCF II), 643 F.3d 1158, 1163 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).
79. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 20–45, TCF I, 643 F.3d 1158 (No. 11-1805); Reply Brief
for Appellant at 6–13, TCF I, 643 F.3d 1158 (No. 11-1805).
80. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1933).
81. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1921).
82. Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
83. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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established a far more deferential standard for regulatory takings, that is,
those takings that limit the use and disposition of particular property
without any dispossession of the tenant. The case’s key passage reads:
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole,” this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop
any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness”
require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. . . .
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,
the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have
particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is
the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may
more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government,
than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.84
In using that test, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concluded that New
York City’s Landmark Preservation Council was within its rights when it
blocked Penn Central’s plan to build a tower over Grand Central Station:
so long as Penn Central was able to cover the costs of its existing
operations, no taking had occurred. For these purposes, it was irrelevant
that air rights were, as a matter of state law, separable property interests
that could be sold or mortgaged in standard market transactions.85 The key
point is that this is a land use case, in which the Court expressed a good
deal of concern about how the construction of this tower would influence
views from various locations, as well as the character of the neighborhood.
These were matters to take into account in this instance, as in dealing with
general zoning laws, where the same level of discretion was allowed.86 In
this case, where multiple externalities were at stake, the level of judicial
scrutiny was low. The land use cases fall into this category.
84. Id. at 124 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), and citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
85. Id. at 136–38.
86. Id. at 125 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 608 (1909); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909)).
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The third relevant class of cases deals with general types of economic
regulations, where once again a high level of deference is the order of the
day under modern constitutional law. Thus, during the New Deal
Revolution, the Supreme Court took it upon itself to approve of minimum
wage laws,87 general prospective rent control laws,88 and in wartime, the
Court in Yakus v. United States sustained a general system of prospective
price controls put forward under loose guidelines that left a fair level of
play in the joints.89 The key feature of these cases is that they were surely a
species of economic regulation to which a highly deferential standard of
review is applied.
In dealing with the interchange issue, both courts erred in thinking that
the rational basis standard applied. The challenge to the Durbin
Amendment certainly does not involve a physical taking and thus looks as
though it falls into either the Penn Central or the Yakus line of cases. But
that analysis is incorrect under current law, for neither of these cases deals
with the protection of financial interests in invested capital from forms of
rate regulation. That law is provided by Armstrong v. United States,90
which opted for a per se rule stating that disproportionate burdens should
not be put on individuals who are asked to shoulder a larger share of the
social burden in connection with some government venture.91 That case
dealt with neither physical occupation of property nor land use regulation.
Instead, the case involved the status of a materialman’s lien that Armstrong
had placed on a U.S. Navy ship, a lien that promptly dissolved when the
boat sailed out of Maine waters.92 Clearly, there was no reason Armstrong
should have to bear a large fraction of the cost of repairing a U.S. vessel,
so the case stands for the proposition that the United States can dissolve
any lien that it chooses, so long as it remains prepared under the Takings
Clause to be sued by the materialman whose actions it has converted into a
general creditor.
That financial context raised none of the issues that are relevant in land
use planning, minimum wage, or price control cases. Indeed, the case bears
the closest resemblance to the physical takings cases, precisely because the
materialman could reduce his lien to possession of the property if the loan
were not discharged. In essence, the case offers a per se rule that applies to
financial claims against discrete physical assets.
Armstrong also ushers in a discussion of the public utility rate
regulation cases that supply the closest parallel to the situation here. The
key point to note about these cases is that, like the materialman’s lien in
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–400 (1937).
See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).
See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 422–23 (1944).
364 U.S. 40 (1960).
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 41–42.
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Armstrong, the protection that is provided under the rule only goes to
previous investments in specific assets that are committed to some specific
economic venture. The great concern is that once the assets are so
committed, the government could restrict the price for which they could be
sold, so that the original investor could not recover the initial fixed costs.
Once that is done, there will not be any other investments in fixed assets of
the sorts that are needed to run major public utilities. Accordingly, the
constitutional protection afforded in those cases departs radically from the
level of protection that is afforded either in the regulatory takings cases
under Penn Central (in which the Supreme Court did not say a word about
rate regulation) or the general economic regulation of the sort at issue in
West Coast Hotel or Yakus. It is therefore no simple historical curiosity that
the major modern case on utility regulation, Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.,93 was decided in the same term as Yakus, yet came
out exactly the opposite, affording some level of protection to assets that
were invested into a business.94
B. Applying Rate Regulation to Competitive Industries with Sunk Costs
The hallmarks of the public utility regulation cases were alluded to in
Judge Piersol’s opinion,95 but without any understanding of the
relationship between natural monopolies and competitive industries.
Owing to technical limitations on the methods of protection, many services
like electric, gas, and telecommunications are industries that require huge
front-end costs to get off the ground, coupled with relatively low marginal
costs for each additional unit of production over some relevant range. That
high fixed-cost, low variable-cost structure makes these public utilities a
natural monopoly—in the sense that, over the relevant range of demand, a
single supplier within a given territory is able to satisfy the market more
cheaply than any two suppliers. This condition holds because the marginal
cost of adding new units of capacity are below the fixed cost of starting a
second plant to compete with the first.96 To leave only one party in the
marketplace, however, is to let it charge monopoly prices, which, under
orthodox economic theory, results in social losses because the quantity of
goods sold is restricted as the price charged increases. The theory of rate
regulation is that for some limited administrative cost, the government can
force the public utility to sell at something that approximates a competitive
price, such that the social gains from expanded output are larger than the
administrative costs expended to achieve it. That proposition can be, and
93. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
94. See id. at 601–05.
95. See TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45059, at *12–13 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).
96. For further discussion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS
REGULATION 4–6 & n.6 (1999).
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indeed has been, disputed.97 But for these purposes, there is no question
that the government in these regulated industries cases has the power to
regulate; the only question is how.
The decision in Hope Natural Gas was not the first effort to develop a
technique to deal with the rate regulation issue. The earlier Supreme Court
decision, Smyth v. Ames,98 asked the reviewing courts first to decide those
assets of the business that were used and useful in service to the public,
and then to calculate an appropriate rate of return on those assets, taking
into account the riskiness of the business. Under Smyth, the public utility
bore the risk that some of its investments would be disqualified, without
quite knowing which ones. In exchange, it received a higher rate of
return.99 The decision in Hope Natural Gas was developed in reaction to
the earlier test, and in it, Justice William O. Douglas iterated a different
test, intended to be easier to administer. His alternative methodology
simply determined the cash and other assets that were committed to the
venture, after which it set a rate of return whose “end result” guaranteed a
reasonable risk-adjusted return to the utility. The point of the system was to
make sure that courts did not have to review each intermediate decision of
the public utility, whose errors could easily cancel out. So long as the
overall limitation was in place, nothing else mattered. It is critical to set out
the main passage in Hope Natural Gas:
The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of
“just and reasonable” rates, involves a balancing of the
investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that “regulation does not
insure that the business shall produce net revenues.” But such
considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate
concern with the financial integrity of the company whose
rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point
of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only
for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the
business. These include service on the debt and dividends on
the stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner
should be commensurate with returns on investments in other
enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover,
should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to
attract capital. The conditions under which more or less might
be allowed are not important here. Nor is it important to this
97. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (offering a
skeptical view of the question).
98. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
99. Id. at 546–47.
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case to determine the various permissible ways in which any
rate base on which the return is computed might be arrived at.
For we are of the view that the end result in this case cannot
be condemned under the Act as unjust and unreasonable from
the investor or company viewpoint.100
This decision remains relevant today. Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch,101 the last rate case considered by the Supreme Court, held that
any ratemaking agency had the choice of whether to follow the Smyth or
Hope standard, but could not, of course, simply disregard the question of
whether the utility had received a protected rate of return for its invested
assets.102 In applying the Hope standard, moreover, the subsequent case
law has held that the state does not discharge its obligation by embarking
on a regime of slow starvation that allows the regulated firm to stave off
bankruptcy but not to get the protected rate of return.103
Perhaps the most instructive of the subsequent cases is Michigan Bell
Telephone Co. v. Engler.104 In that case, the Michigan Public Service
Commission applied a methodology that allowed the telephone company to
recover its costs under the so-called Total Service Long Run Incremental
Cost (TSLRIC), which was defined as follows:
Total service long run incremental costs means, given
current service demand, including associated costs of every
component necessary to provide the service, 1 of the
100. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (citations
omitted) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 590
(1942)).
101. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
102. Id. at 308–10.
103. See, for example, Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which stated:
At oral argument before the en banc court, counsel for the Commission indicated
that the “end result” test did allow a court to set aside a rate order when the
company would otherwise go bankrupt and the Commission had refused to take
that into account. The source of this constricted standard is elusive, not to say
invisible. Hope Natural Gas talks not of an interest in avoiding bankruptcy, but an
interest in maintaining access to capital markets, the ability to pay dividends, and
general financial integrity. While companies about to go bankrupt would certainly
see such interests threatened, companies less imminently imperiled will sometimes
be able to make that claim as well. Jersey Central alleges that it is such a company.
The contention that no company that is not clearly headed for bankruptcy has a
judicially enforceable right to have its financial status considered when its rates
are determined must be rejected.
Id. at 1180; see also Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1253–56 (Cal. 1989) (en
banc).
104. 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
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following:
(i) The total forward-looking cost of a telecommunication
service, relevant group of service, or basic network
component, using current least cost technology that would be
required if the provider had never offered the service.
(ii) The total cost that the provider would incur if the
provider were to initially offer the service, group of service,
or basic network component.105
The Sixth Circuit granted Michigan Bell’s request for a preliminary
injunction on the ground that this formula did not allow the utility to
recover its constitutionally guaranteed rate of return under the Hope test
because it made no allowance for any positive rate of return at all.106 The
difficulty with the TSLRIC standard is that it insists that, at each interval,
the position of the utility be regulated as if it had just made the most
efficient investment in state-of-the-art technology. In an industry in which
there are high rates of technological advance, that standard means that,
over the life of any particular investment, it is certain that the utility cannot
recover its fixed costs, given the systematic exclusion of its front-end costs
from the system. The methodology was so flawed that there was no reason
to wait until the utility had lost its invested capital, and thus a preliminary
injunction was granted even under the exacting standards of proving
irreparable harm applicable under that standard.107
The precedent here is clear. The appropriate strategy in the traditional
rate regulation case requires a determination of the full rate base from
which the appropriate rate of return is required. At this point, it is best to
think of the traditional rate regulation case as an amalgam that incorporates
various standards of constitutional review. The insistence on the proper
“end result” is a hard line rule that resonates with the strict scrutiny test
used in both the physical occupation and the lien cases—Loretto and
Armstrong, respectively—because there are none of the neighborhood
effects found in the Penn Central line of land use cases, or the large
prospective schemes of regulation at issue in cases like West Coast Hotel,
Pennell, and Yakus. Hence, the correct statement of the current legal
position is that, so long as the state uses the correct end point, it has some
discretion in the choice of methodologies used. But once it is clear that the
methodology does not allow for the recovery of the invested capital, then
the statute must fail. Nothing in the Penn Central, Pennell, or Yakus lines
of cases interfere with this result. Indeed, not a single ratemaking case cites
Penn Central, precisely because it deals with a different universe of legal
problems. Nor do the words “rational basis” appear in the ratemaking
105. Id. at 595 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 484.2102(ff)).
106. Id. at 594–95.
107. See supra note 22.
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cases, even though that is the standard explicitly embraced.
The most critical question is how these public utility cases carry over to
the current problem. At no point did either the District Court or Eighth
Circuit address this question. Rather, they simply assumed—wrongly—that
the absence of monopoly power eliminated the possibility of ratemaking
abuse in the government, when the exact opposite is true. The monopoly
firm has an excess cushion that gives it some protection against
government abuse. The competitive firm has no such protection, for it is
already at the competitive rate prior to the imposition of any system of rate
regulation.
At this point, it is critical to explore two key differences between the
public utility with the natural monopoly and the debit card bank with no
market power. One deals with industry structure and the other with the
possibility of revenue recoupment from other sources. First, TCF and the
other regulated banks operate in a competitive environment in which there
are no territorial limitations either on their business or on the ability of new
firms to enter their markets. Second, the standard regulated utility has only
one source of income, its customer base, at which point it must be treated
like a competitive firm, such that it has a fair chance to earn the
appropriate rate of return on its assets from that single source. The
situation for TCF and the other banks under the Durbin Amendment is
different because they are explicitly allowed to recoup whatever revenue
loss they suffer from the loss of interchange fees from their own customers,
an opportunity that is not available to standard public utilities.
The key question is how these two elements blend together, given that
they cut in opposite directions. On the first point, the fact that the regulated
banks are in a competitive market is a strong mark against the
constitutionality of the legislation. Yet at the same time, the fact that there
is pricing freedom between the bank and its customers cuts in exactly the
opposite direction, supporting the constitutionality of the regulation. The
key inquiry, therefore, is how to evaluate the combined effect of these two
factors in shaping the market setting in which TCF seeks to enjoin the
operation of the statute. In effect, the regulation in question imposes a real
loss on the defendants which counts, this Article argues, as a taking of their
property, for which the ability to recoup from customers counts as a form
of just compensation.
In dealing with these twin elements, it would be necessary to calculate
the precise loss in net value to the regulated banks if the issue was whether
some compensation should make good their shortfall. But in this case the
government does not have the slightest interest in giving compensation, so
it is no longer necessary that TCF show exactly how much it loses through
the imposition of the regulation. So long as it can marshal evidence that it
will come up short, even by a penny, then it is entitled to enjoin the
regulation, just as a landowner whose property is worth exactly $100 can
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resist a government takeover if it were prepared to pay only $99.99. In this
case the calculations are not nearly so close, but in fact are likely to cause
major financial dislocations even with the new and higher Federal Reserve
Rate. The next section examines the two pieces of this puzzle in sequence.
C. The Dedicated Assets of Banks in Their Debit Card Systems Are
Entitled to Full Constitutional Protection
1. The Relevance of the Public Utility Cases
TCF and other banks have dedicated specific assets toward their debit
card business. Sinking those costs in that business raises questions of what
items are included in the rate base, but these are not unique questions. The
Federal Reserve, when it runs its own check-clearing apparatus, charges
merchants for the cost of clearing checks under the regulations that it has
issued pursuant to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980,108 whose regulations are published under the heading
“Policies: Principles for the Pricing of Federal Reserve Bank Services.”109
The two main purposes of this system are to “encourage competition to
ensure provision of these services at the lowest cost to society,” and to
“ensure[] an adequate level of services nationwide.”110
The key regulation reads as follows:
Over the long run, fees shall be established on the basis of
all direct and indirect costs actually incurred in providing the
Federal Reserve services priced, including interest on items
credited prior to actual collection, overhead, and an allocation
of imputed costs which takes into account the taxes that
would have been paid and the return on capital that would
have been provided had the services been furnished by a
private business firm, except that the pricing principles shall
give due regard to competitive factors and the provision of an
adequate level of such services nationwide.111
The explicit emphasis on “all direct and indirect costs” and “the return
on capital that would have been provided had the services been furnished
by a private business firm” echo the Hope Natural Gas formula for
defining the rate base and calculating the appropriate return needed. For
banks covered by the Durbin Amendment, that rate base includes all the
108. Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, sec. 101–08, 94 Stat. 132, 132–41
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
109. Policies: Principles for the Pricing of the Federal Reserve Bank Services, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/
pfs_principles.htm (last updated Nov. 20, 2008).
110. Id.
111. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(c)(3) (2006).
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costs of installation, maintenance, and upgrade of the computer system, as
well as the various expenses needed to operate the system. These expenses
on both physical hardware and service are included in the rate base of any
regulated public utility, and should also be included here. The fact that they
are explicitly excluded, even under the broad reading that the Federal
Reserve Board gives to incremental costs, indicates that there is a serious
shortfall that must be taken into account.
Both courts took the government’s position that none of these
calculations matter because none of the banks regulated under the Durbin
Amendment counted as public utilities.112 As noted above,113 the key case
was Minnesota Ass’n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Minnesota
Department of Public Welfare,114 where the District Court addressed a
question that the Court of Appeals skirted, namely whether the plaintiff
nursing homes could challenge the adequacy of rates that they had
voluntarily accepted.115 The simple and correct way to turn aside that
challenge was to note that contracts with the government are no different
from those with private parties, such that a person could not turn around
and demand compensation on a losing contract. But rather than follow that
sufficient regime, the court held that the public utilities cases were not
relevant at all:
Cases concerning public utilities are inapposite, however,
because the present case simply does not involve a forced
taking of property by the state. Minnesota nursing homes,
unlike public utilities, have freedom to decide whether to
remain in business and thus subject themselves voluntarily to
the limits imposed by Minnesota on the return they obtain
from investment of their assets in nursing home operation.116
In addition, the two courts took the further position that the public
utility cases are inapposite because the banks under the Durbin
Amendment are entitled to withdraw from the industry altogether, and are
thus not in the position of a public utility that is,117 according to Duquesne
Light, required to serve its customers.118 The problem with this argument,
if it is correct, is that it sidesteps the issue of whether any compensation is
owed, by making the prior claim that this exhaustive scheme of regulation
does not trigger any investigation under the Takings Clause. The
112. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059,
at *12–13 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).
113. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
114. 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 446.
116. Id.
117. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12–13.
118. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989).
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government then bolstered this position by examining the particular
clauses in the TCF contracts. Claiming that TCF’s indefinite contractual
terms similarly precluded a Takings Clause claim on the ground that TCF
did not have any “protectable” interest under the Takings Clause, the
government pointed to Visa’s Core Principles, which allows Visa to alter
its rates under the following contractual provision:
Interchange is consistently monitored and adjusted—
sometimes increased and sometimes decreased—in order to
ensure that the economics present a competitive value
proposition for all parties. Interchange reimbursement fees
must encourage card holding and use, as well as expansion
in the number and types of businesses that accept cards. If
rates are too high, retailers won’t accept cards; if rates are
too low, issuers won’t issue cards. Visa may establish
different interchange reimbursement fees in order to
promote a variety of system objectives, such as enhancing
the value proposition for Visa products, providing
incentives to grow merchant acceptance and usage, and
reinforcing strong system security and transaction
authorization practices.119
2. The Relevance of a Protectable Interest
It is just a category mistake to assume, as both courts inaccurately did,
that the principles of rate regulation do not apply solely because banks
operate in a competitive industry. The basic problem that these banks face
remains the same as it was for public utilities: without constitutional
protection of future returns, they could not sink investments today. The
constitutional return thus sparks the initial investment. Banks have that
problem even if they operate in a competitive industry, with only this
difference: in these cases, there normally is no need for rate regulation to
insure that firms in a competitive industry charge a competitive rate; that is
what they will do in any event. Indeed, it is precisely because they are at a
competitive rate that any system of rate regulation that fails to guarantee
compensation will deprive them of their constitutional right to a
competitive rate of return, i.e., a rate that allows them to attract and retain
capital. Put otherwise, there is less justification for regulating a competitive
firm than there is for regulating a public utility because the competitive
firm has no monopoly power, when, contrary to Judge Piersol’s
observation, it is that element of monopoly power that justifies state
119. VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS: CORE PRINCIPLES 10 (2010),
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulationscore.pdf.
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regulation of standard public utilities.120 In other words, all rate regulation
of competitive firms is unconstitutional unless there is some offsetting
advantage.
In its brief, the Government argues that the key difference is that firms
in competitive industries are not “obligated” to stay in that industry, which
is not the case for public utilities required to serve the public.121 As stated
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “As public utilities, both Duquesne and
[copetitioner] Penn Power are under a state statutory duty to serve the
public.”122 But the point is wrong on every count. First, the traditional
definition of a public utility referred to a company that was the sole
supplier in a given territory. It was only required to serve the public so long
as it remained in business, which meant that, as the sole supplier of an
essential service, it could not refuse to serve customers within its service
area. The “required” element was universal service, not a duty to remain in
business. Historically, public utilities were always allowed to withdraw
from a given market, so long as they gave notice of their intention, which
allowed for an orderly transition.123 The modern position, which requires
certain public utilities to get government approval to withdraw from the
market, is a departure from the traditional rule. The distinction concerning
withdrawal rights, moreover, is quite irrelevant to the issue at hand, which
is whether a government maneuver on rates is constitutional, even when it
makes it impossible for the firm to recoup its investment with a reasonable
rate of return over the expected life of the project.
Consider first the variation where the established firm is not allowed to
withdraw from the market. In these circumstances, the government is
surely right to concede the risk of expropriation, for without constitutional
rate protection, the firm could be forced to provide services for trifling
sums that do not even cover its variable costs, which could result in losses
120. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *13.
121. Brief for Government, supra note 49, at 30–32.
122. Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 307.
123. See, e.g., H.W. Chaplin, Limitations Upon the Right of Withdrawal from Public
Employment, 16 HARV. L. REV. 555, 555 (1903). The relevant passage reads as follows:
It is undoubtedly true—and allusion is made to it in the opinion in Munn v.
Illinois—that where a public right in property or to service arises from a voluntary
holding out of the property or the service to the public, it may ordinarily be
terminated by a withdrawal of the offer of public use. . . .
This rule is, however, obviously subject to the qualification that one cannot
abruptly, and without reasonable opportunity to the public to change their own
affairs accordingly, so terminate his relations with the public. For example, an
innkeeper could not lawfully put a sudden end to his business in the middle of a
winter night, nor a common carrier suddenly leave his occupation and abandon his
passengers or freight by the roadside . . . .
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)).
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of not only its front-end fixed costs, but all variable costs as well.
Alternatively, suppose that the right to withdraw is given absolutely.
The modern public utility is a far different creature than the horse and
buggy that had a franchise on the road from London to Oxford. Once that
team is withdrawn from public service, it has alternative private uses that
effectively negate the risk that its owner will not be able to recover the cost
of capital. Indeed, in these cases the risk of abuse from withdrawal lies
with the franchise holder, not the government, which is why the notice
requirement is imposed. But with modern public utilities that have capital
in the ground, the utility would withdraw from doing business only if it
could not recover its variable costs. If it could recover all of its variable
costs, it would remain in business even if it could not recover all of its
fixed costs plus a reasonable rate of return during the useful life of the
asset. The risk of expropriation without falling into bankruptcy thus
remains whether or not withdrawal is allowed. All that the exit right does
is reduce the size of the potential expropriation. It does not eliminate it.
That exact same risk of expropriation faces the competitive firm that
has made fixed investments in a given line of business. Once those
investments are made, that firm is as vulnerable to government action as
the firm that has the utility. A system of price controls that is keyed to
variable (or incremental) costs, like the Durbin Amendment, does not
afford the competitive firm any more opportunity to recover its fixed costs
than the public utility, which is why it is entitled to constitutional
protection against expropriation. That point, moreover, is explicitly
recognized in the cases. The provision of automobile insurance, for
example, is supplied in competitive industries from which individual
insurers have a right to withdraw. Yet it is beyond doubt that the state
cannot justify confiscatory rates by pointing to the ability of the firm to
withdraw from the market at the cost of losing its fixed investment. Thus,
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance,124 cited in
TCF’s appellate brief125 but ignored by the court, put the point as follows:
The Commonwealth’s admitted power to regulate the
insurance business and the rates which are charged for
insurance does not permit it to limit the conduct of such
business to those companies which submit to whatever rates
the Commonwealth may fix, even if they be confiscatory. The
writing of insurance is a lawful business and the
Commonwealth may not impose unconstitutional conditions
upon the exercise of the right to engage therein. While it is
not constitutionally required to fix rates which will guarantee
124. 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1970).
125. Brief of Appellant TCF National Bank at 31, TCF National Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d
1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011) (No. 11-1805), 2011 WL 1849198.
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a profit to all insurers, it may not constitutionally fix rates
which are so low that if the insurers engage in business they
may do so only at a loss. The insurers are not required to
either submit to confiscatory rates or go out of business. They
have a right to rates which are not confiscatory, or which
satisfy any higher applicable statutory standards; and to a
judicial review on the constitutional or statutory adequacy of
such rates.126
It follows, therefore, that none of the regulated banks forfeit the
constitutional challenge simply because they operate in a competitive
market from which they have a right to leave if they so choose. The
situation does not differ on the ground that none of the regulated banks
have a so-called protected interest in their customer. That same point can
be made with respect to all public utilities, whose customers are not bound
to take their services at the stipulated rate. Public utilities receive their
protection because of their interest in a rate structure that allows them,
assuming the rational behavior of their customers, the opportunity to earn a
constitutional rate of return. That situation does not change because the
supposed vulnerability of the regulated banks comes from the core terms of
the Visa contract (for which there is, of course, a close analogue for
MasterCard127). The key point here is that any party that enters into a good
faith arrangement takes at least some risk that the price fluctuations would
be less than they hoped for. But those risks are offset by the possibility of
price shifts in the opposite direction. In the case of the instant debit card
contracts, there is a long history of acquired practice that signals a high
level of stability in these arrangements between the parties. The one risk
the banks did not assume was that some third party would use brute force
to upset their private arrangements with the network platforms. When the
deliberate actions of third persons disrupt these ongoing arrangements,
both parties can sue the intervener for interference with prospective
advantage. The power of the government to undertake actions that disrupt
these relationships, but only if they are prepared to pay compensation for
the losses that they engage, is exactly why confiscatory rates are enjoined:
at no point has the federal government indicated a willingness to pay for
the losses that it has inflicted. It follows, therefore, that the issue of
protectable interest does not help the Government’s case at all.

126. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263 N.E.2d at 703 (citations omitted).
127. See MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL INTERCHANGE RATES (2011),
available at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/MasterCard_Interchange_Rates_and
_Criteria.pdf.
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3. The Role of Good Faith Contracting
Even if some protectable interest was required, these contracts supply
it. As a matter of straight contract law, Judge Piersol was wrong when he
said that the provisions in the Visa/TCF contract allowed Visa
“unmitigated” discretion to set whatever rates it chose.128 The parties to the
contract never conceived of their relationship in that manner during the
long period during which it has been in place, and the law in these cases
always circumscribes the power that the dominant party—here the ratesetter—has by imposing on it a duty to act in good faith, which essentially
requires it to take steps that allow all parties to the deal to achieve a
reasonable rate of return over the life of the contract.
To see why, it is critical to read the key provisions of the Visa/TCF
contract in light of the problem that they seek to address. It is not possible
to determine at the outset a fixed set of rates for the life of a contract, given
the unexpected fluctuations that could be necessitated by shifts in supply
and demand, changes in technology, or alterations in the regulatory
environment. Yet at the same time Visa understands that, in order for this
network to persist, each party to the transaction has to receive a net benefit
from its continued participation in it. Accordingly, Visa pledges to keep
rates within a range that induces all participants to remain inside the
system by promising to provide net benefits to all participants.129 It is, of
course, the case that Visa cannot allow itself to be sued by either merchants
or banks for each rate fluctuation, but it surely pledges to operate in good
faith to achieve the desired goal. Good faith obligations of this sort are
commonplace in the world of common law adjudication.
Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote in Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon130 that long-term arrangements are “instinct with an obligation,”
which requires one contracting party to afford the other the opportunity to
recover its costs plus a reasonable return on their labor or capital.131 In
Wood, Judge Cardozo held that the defendant fashion-designer, who had
given an exclusive license to the plaintiff marketer to promote her goods,
could not terminate the arrangement at will on the blithe assumption that
the plaintiff was not bound to do anything at all. Cardozo wrote:
The agreement of employment is signed by both parties. It
has a wealth of recitals. The defendant insists, however, that it
lacks the elements of a contract. She says that the plaintiff
128. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059,
at *14 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).
129. VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS: CORE PRINCIPLES 10 (2010),
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulationscore.pdf.
130. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
131. Id. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/1

36

Epstein: The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment: How Monopolie

2011]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADOX OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT

1343

does not bind himself to anything. It is true that he does not
promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts
to place the defendant’s indorsements and market her designs.
We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be
implied. The law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman,
and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A
promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be
“instinct with an obligation,” imperfectly expressed. If that is
so, there is a contract.132
Earlier, in Moran v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,133 Judge Cardozo
used that same phase—“instinct with an obligation”134—to prevent an
employer from terminating a five-year employment agreement before the
plaintiff had a chance to recover his costs by earning commissions: “An
intention to make so one-sided an agreement is not to be readily
inferred.”135 Judge Richard A. Posner has recently expressed that same
sentiment in Market Street Associates v. Frey.136 Thus, it is common to
read in “the implied condition that an exclusive dealer will use his best
efforts to promote the supplier’s goods, since otherwise the exclusive
feature of the dealership contract would place the supplier at the dealer’s
mercy.”137 Similar principles have also been incorporated into the Uniform
Commercial Code’s rules on output and requirements contracts.138
Visa has made just that sort of commitment in the debit interchange
market. Therefore, it could not reduce the rates it pays to zero just because
it decided to do so. At the very least, the bank would have the right to
withdraw for a material breach of contract, and in cases of manifest bad
faith, the bank could probably sue to recover its lost profits from the earlier
arrangement. There are, of course, no suits of this sort involving debit card
interchange because Visa and MasterCard, conscious of the importance of
their reputation and customer good will, would not take irrational steps that
would squander these painfully-acquired advantages. It is, therefore,
wholly wrong to think that there is no protectable interest under these
contracts, even if such were required to make out a takings case.
Nor is it necessary that each of Visa’s customers make a gain on each
transaction. As with ratemaking generally, the key issue is whether the
entire relationship generates a profit, not whether each element of an
132. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914).
134. Id. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 220.
136. See 941 F.2d 588, 595–96 (7th Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 596 (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)).
138. U.C.C. § 2-306 (2004) (noting that the quantity term in both output and requirements
contracts is governed by principles of good faith).
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extended package purports to do so. That rule works, moreover, to the long
term advantage of all of the individual franchisees of a common vendor,
who otherwise could not coordinate their promotional activities. Thus, the
close affinity between good faith contract principles and generalized
ratemaking principles is found in many cases that deal with disputes
between franchisors and franchisees, as well.
One good example of how this process works is found in National
Franchisee Ass’n v. Burger King Corp.139 Burger King required its
franchisees to carry a $1.00 Value Meal item, which it had to sell at a
loss.140 The court held that Burger King did not act in bad faith because it
made the decision to include the Value Meal “with the honest belief that
the measure it is adopting will help the company meet competition and
succeed in the marketplace.”141 So long as Burger King’s overall set of
prices allowed its franchisees to recover their cost and make a reasonable
profit, they could not complain about having to bear their fair share of the
promotional costs. At this point, the uniform standards Burger King sets
for its franchisees are an effort to stop a prisoner’s dilemma game among
franchisees, where each wants to free-ride on the promotion efforts of other
franchisees. Indeed, to allow individual franchisees to opt out of the
promotional events would undermine the principle of equal treatment for
all franchises and allow the unilateral actions of some to undermine the
collective good of all. The duty of good faith, therefore, does not require
the impossible of franchisees, but rather, makes perfectly good sense in the
way that the Durbin Amendment does not: it allows for the coordination of
multiple franchisees in ways that advance their common interest.
In the end, therefore, we can say that there are two clear rights that
inhere to TCF and other banks in these arrangements. First, if Visa set its
rates so as to deprive the banks of their contract rights, they could
withdraw from the arrangement even though it is for a specified term.
Second, and more critically, TCF could sue Visa for damages arising from
a breach of that arrangement in the same way that Wood could sue Lady
Duff Gordon for her decision to withdraw unilaterally from the deal. Good
faith contracts are not idle. If there were some need for a protectable
interest, these contracts, which do supply meaningful business protection,
offer that interest. The reason why there is so little litigation on this point is
that no one ever takes the steps that both courts wrongly supposed Visa
was allowed.

139. No. 09-23435-CIV, 2010 WL 4811912 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010).
140. Id. at *1.
141. Id. at *3.
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4. Just Compensation
The last piece of the puzzle is whether the constitutional test for just
compensation is satisfied. In dealing with this issue generally,
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States142 sets out the standard that,
“in view of the combination of those two words [—just and
compensation—there can] be no doubt that the compensation must be a
full and perfect equivalent for the property taken.”143 In land cases, this
translates into the fair market value of the land. In cases of ratemaking,
with the constitutional obligation to meet the end result, the test is the
same: is the financial position in which a firm is placed one that allows it
to attract and retain capital sufficient to earn a competitive rate of return?
In approaching this question, the first issue is whether TCF operates in
a competitive market. Both courts assumed that it did, even though huge
portions of the debate over the Durbin Amendment questioned whether
this was true. As noted above, the correct answer is that the market is as
competitive as it can get. Once that assumption is made, it is now possible
to recast the general test for just compensation in this form: did the
government regulation allow the regulated banks the same rate of return on
their debit card investments as they had before the statute was put into
place? The mere fact that these lawsuits were brought is evidence enough
that the possibility of offsets in the form of higher fees against debit card
customers is not sufficient to produce that result. Why would anyone sue if
their options for mitigation were perfect? It is far more rational to go on
with business, substituting a new income stream whose net present
discounted value was equal to the one that was displaced.
It is also possible to identify a number of reasons why the net position
after regulation could not equal the rate before regulation. In dealing with
this issue it is necessary to consider two different scenarios about how the
Durbin Amendment will be administered. Under the first, it is assumed that
all banks will be subject to the same rate restrictions as the large banks,
notwithstanding the exemption for banks with less than $10 billion in
assets. Under the second, it is assumed that the smaller banks are able to
collect their higher interchange fees, and thus not raise costs to their own
customers.
Under the first scenario, there is no question that if these regulations
were imposed on banks before they started their debit card business, they
would be a prospective form of regulation that is immune from challenge
under the rational basis test. But, as noted above, they were not. Instead,
they were imposed after the current system was put into place by voluntary
transactions. At this point, the movement to the new system is necessarily
inefficient because it removes the use of cross-payments which increase the
142. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
143. Id. at 326.
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efficiency of a two-sided market. Quite simply, any system that prohibits
those cross-payments is necessarily less efficient than one that allows
them. The shrinkage in the pie therefore means that some party has been
hurt. It is not the retailers, so the loss has to be borne by the other parties to
the transaction. Detailed empirical work is needed to show the exact
magnitude and incidence of this loss, but even if it cannot be measured, it
is perfectly certain that the regulated banks have suffered some portion of
it. Therefore, if the above analysis of rate regulation is correct, the banks
are entitled to compensation for these losses. Note that in this form, there is
complete evidence of irreparable harm to the banks, for even if they can
mitigate the loss to a greater or lesser extent, that mitigation never restores
them to the position they had before the regulation was imposed. Since no
compensation is offered for that unmeasured loss, the act has to be
enjoined. Indeed the situation is even clearer that full compensation is not
provided, for it is evident that there is an additional loss to consumers, who
will have to pay more in direct fees to their banks than they paid under the
prior interchange system for the same services. Throw in the high
administrative costs of running this system, and it is clear that a deviation
from the competitive equilibrium necessarily occurs. The compensation
offset falls short in all cases, and therefore cannot supply just
compensation.
The second permutation requires the assumption that there is some
monopoly power at play. Ironically, on this issue everyone was arguing the
wrong side of the case. The experts for TCF should have insisted that they
had monopoly power so as to get a competitive rate of return. The
government should have insisted that the industry was perfectly
competitive, even if it meant repudiating everything that Senator Durbin
said to the contrary. That weird role reversal, of course, should never be
expected: it is only in the judicial wonderland of these two opinions that
being in a monopoly position becomes a key asset to the regulated firm.
On the usual assumption that monopoly power offers a reason to
regulate, the case is far thinner here than in the standard public utility that
operates a relatively static technology in an exclusive territory with a
captive customer base. The debit interchange system is marked by the lack
of territorial exclusivity, and the constant innovation of new technologies
means that the residual level of monopoly profit must be small. As such,
the regulation has to be modest lest it cut below the guaranteed rate of a
competitive return. In this case, we know that the results cannot come
close. In addition to all the imperfections noted above, the system of rate
regulation under the Durbin Amendment does not even attempt to estimate
the appropriate rate base due to its systematic truncation. It is irrelevant
whether the Federal Reserve gave a more generous set of rates to the
banking industry the second time round. Rather, the question is whether it
tried to set those rates in a way that guaranteed the competitive rate of
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return on capital, to which the answer is an emphatic no. Again, there is no
real debate about this point, which simply disappears from view at every
stage of the proceeding: there was no effort to build up the correct rate
base, to determine the extent of monopoly power, to look at risk-related
returns, or anything else. The case, therefore, does not come within a
country mile of meeting any of the many formulations for rate base
determination set out above.
Thus, wholly apart from any reference to the $10 billion asset
exemption, the Durbin Amendment is dead on arrival under any sensible
rate regulation analysis that does not limit coverage only to monopoly
industries. Once that new fact comes in, it only strengthens the conclusion.
If the small banks continue to get their exemption, there is little question
that the big banks will be at a huge competitive advantage. As Anne
Layne-Farrar noted in her TCF report, the customer base of banks like TCF
is fragile to begin with, as over 20% of their accounts open and close each
year. A rough estimate of $100 in additional bank fees, whether by swipe
or by month, will induce low income customers to close their accounts,
which could lead to an erosion of the rate base.144 The current system of
charges does not require a big supplement, but again, that point hardly
matters. So long as we know that the Durbin Amendment would supply
insufficient protection without the $10 billion asset exemption, this is an a
fortiori case against its constitutionality, even if it assumed that the equal
protection challenge dies a quick death under the rational basis test.
CONCLUSION
The decisions in the TCF case offer powerful insights into the
intellectual complacency that dominates judicial decisionmaking in takings
cases today. It simply defies comprehension to think that a firm gets more
constitutional protection when it has monopoly power than when it
operates in a competitive industry. Outside the peculiar context of this
case, no one has ever thought that competitive firms should be more
vulnerable to government expropriation than monopoly firms. Yet that
explicit mistaken assumption drove this case, leading to an erroneous
analysis of every relevant question pertaining to rate-of-return regulation.
The short and simple statement of this case is that the strong rate
regulation of the Durbin Amendment must leave the regulated firms with
the same competitive rate of return with which they started. In this
instance, the regulation leaves them below that level. Moreover, the option
to charge customers does not restore the firms to the competitive rate of
return they previously enjoyed. Surely a taking without just compensation
should be enjoined. Perhaps someday the Supreme Court will repair the
144. ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR, ASSESSING TCF CUSTOMER PRICE SENSITIVITY IN RELATION TO THE
DURBIN AMENDMENT (2010).
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intellectual damage to the Takings Clause that the Eighth Circuit inflicted
in TCF National Bank v. Bernanke.
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